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资本多数觉得现代公司制度使控股股东处于支配公司的优势地位。在不完全竞争的市场中,借助于这一天然的优势,控股股东实施了比自由市场效率更高、风险更小的内部化的关联交易。然受追逐私利最大化的驱使,控股股东的关联交易迈上了不当的方向。笔者对控股股东不当关联交易进行了分析并阐明了其所具有的危害和其应当承担的法律责任。
Most of the capital think the modern company system makes the controlling shareholder in the dominance of dominant companies. In an imperfectly competitive market, with this natural advantage, controlling shareholders implement affiliate transactions that are more efficient and less risky than the free market. However, driven by the pursuit of self-interest maximization, the controlling shareholder’s connected transactions went the wrong direction. The author analyzes the improper connected transactions of the controlling shareholder and clarifies the harm it has and the legal responsibilities it should bear.