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针对重大工程设计施工总承包模式(DB)下总承包商和分包商的合作创新问题,基于演化视角建立博弈模型,研究在有限理性下二者之间的合作机制,同时对合作创新中存在的溢出效应、收益分配、激励与补贴对演化稳定策略的影响进行了探讨。研究结果表明,在一定的情形下,合作给创新主体带来的溢出效应、单独研发收益和合作创新的超额收益对双方的合作具正效用;创新成本及总承包商的补贴系数的增加则不利于双方走向合作;存在一个最优的超额利益分配系数时,使得双方实现共赢;业主采取合适的策略介入,可以促进承包商之间的合作。
Aiming at the cooperation and innovation of general contractors and subcontractors under the mode of general engineering design and construction general contracting (DB), the game model is established based on evolutionary perspective and the cooperation mechanism under the bounded rationality is studied. At the same time, The spillover effects, income distribution, incentives and subsidies on the evolutionary stability strategy were discussed. The results show that under certain conditions, the spillover effect, the separate R & D revenue and the excess returns from cooperative innovation are positive for the cooperation between the two parties. The innovation cost and the increase of the general contractor’s subsidy coefficient are not Which will benefit both parties to cooperate. When there is an optimal coefficient of excess profit distribution, both parties will achieve a win-win situation. Owners may take appropriate strategic interventions to promote the cooperation between contractors.