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建立现代企业制度,对国有企业进行公司化改革,有助于法人产权的界定,在相当程度上解决了“产权不明晰”的问题,也在一定程度上分散了国有资产承担的风险,但是,并没有解决国有资产的安全和增值这一改革的核心问题.其根子在于改革后的股份企业还缺乏有效的代理层(董事会、总经理)激励和约束机制.一、西方现代股份企业委托——代理关系与建立代理层激励、约束机制的一般分析从理论上看,股份制企业的委托——代理关系,孕育着代理者对所有者利益损害的可能性.所谓委托——代理关系,是指资产所有者不能亲自控制和经营自己的资产,而将其委托给某个机构或个人代为控制和经营.在西方,委托——代理现象是自然人企业向现代股份公司过渡的过程中逐步发展起来的.从19世纪末开始,生产力迅速发展受到自然人企业资本不足的限制,为突破这一
The establishment of a modern enterprise system and the corporatization of state-owned enterprises are conducive to the definition of the legal person’s property rights. To a large extent, the problem of “unclear property rights” has been solved and the risks borne by state-owned assets have been dispersed to a certain extent. However, And did not solve the core issue of the reform of the security and value-added of state-owned assets.The root lies in the lack of an effective incentive and restraint mechanism of the proxy (board of directors and general manager) in the reform of the shareholding enterprises.First, Agent relationship and the establishment of the general analysis of the agency incentive, restraint mechanism In theory, the joint-stock enterprises of the principal-agent relationship, pregnant with the possibility of agents damage to the interests of the owner.The so-called principal-agent relationship refers to the assets The owner can not control and manage his own assets, and entrust it to an institution or individual to control and operate on behalf of the owner.In the West, the principal-agent phenomenon is the gradual development of natural persons in the transition to modern joint-stock companies. From the beginning of the 19th century, the rapid development of productive forces was constrained by the shortage of natural-capital enterprises’ capital. In order to break this