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本文对晚清从甲戌至甲午20年间的海防之议与甲午战争的关系进行了系统论述。首先,由1874年日本侵台事件而引发的第一次海防之议为北洋海军的初创提供了契机。其次,因1884年中法战争而再次兴起的海防之议,清政府制订了“以大治水师为主”的计划,使北洋海军于1888年正式成军。第三,1894年的中日甲午战争爆发不久,清廷重申“海军为国家第一要务”。北洋海军虽有黄海一搏,却又在李鸿章“保船”思想的束缚下,逐步失去了制海权,最终坐以待毙。持续了20余年的海防之议经甲午之役是可以总结出成效与教训的。
This article systematically discusses the relationship between the defense of Haiphong in the late Qing Dynasty from Jiaxu to Jiawu during the 20 years and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. First, the first wave of the Haitian protests triggered by Japan’s invasion of Taiwan in 1874 provided an opportunity for the Northern navy to start its own business. Second, due to the re-establishment of Haiphong on the Sino-French War of 1884, the Qing government formulated a plan of “treating the great navy as the mainstay,” and the Beiyang Navy officially entered the army in 1888. Thirdly, shortly after the Sino-Japanese-Sino-Japanese War of 1894 broke out, the Qing reaffirmed “the Navy’s top priority for the country.” Although the North Sea navy strikes the Yellow Sea, it gradually loses its sea power under the shackles of Li Hongzhang’s thinking of “securing the ship.” After more than 20 years of defense, the proposal of Haiphong can be concluded with results and lessons learned.