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本国企业通过第三国中间商向第三国出口产品,并与另一国直接向第三国出口的企业进行产量竞争,本国企业根据其谈判势力大小确定其出售给中间商的产品价格。在此背景下,本文考察了一国最优的战略性贸易政策。研究结果表明,谈判势力影响到本国政府抽取中间商的利润,进而影响本国政府的出口贸易政策选择。对另一国政府而言,其贸易政策的选择则受到企业进入市场的时序与企业谈判势力的影响。此外,两国出口政策的博弈并不一定会导致“囚徒困境”。
Domestic enterprises export their products to third countries through third-country intermediaries and compete with other countries for export directly to third countries. According to the size of their negotiating power, domestic enterprises determine the prices of products they sell to middlemen. Against this background, this paper examines the best strategic trade policy in a country. The results show that the negotiating forces affect the profitability of their own governments in extracting intermediaries, thereby affecting their own government’s export trade policy options. For another government, the choice of its trade policy is influenced by the timing of its entry into the market and by the forces of business negotiation. In addition, the game of export policies between the two countries does not necessarily lead to “prisoner’s dilemma.”