论文部分内容阅读
知觉认识论旨在解释知觉经验是如何辩护知觉信念的,它涉及知觉辩护的本性与结构。来自现象学与认知科学的证据表明,知觉辩护是非推理的,它并不包含一个以所辩护的信念为结论的推理过程。知觉辩护是直接的,即知觉经验对知觉信念的辩护并不依赖于对其他信念的辩护。知觉经验之所以能够为知觉信念提供直接辩护,是因为它具有一种特别的内容,即现象内容。现象内容是以外部事物及其性质本身为组分的宽内容。源于现象内容的辩护是不可击败的。知觉辩护的不可击败性与知觉能力的可错性是相容的。这样理解的知觉辩护概念既没有解释上的困难,它也不会产生不好的结果,因而是适切的。
Perception epistemology aims to explain how perceptual experience justifies perceptual beliefs, which involves the nature and structure of perceptual justification. Evidence from phenomenological and cognitive science suggests that perceptual justification is non-reasoning and does not include an inference process that concludes on the basis of the defensible beliefs. Perception justification is straightforward, ie perceptual experience’s defense of perceptual beliefs does not depend on the defense of other beliefs. The reason that perceptual experience provides a direct defense of perceptual beliefs is that it has a special content, namely, the content of the phenomenon. Phenomenon content is based on external things and their nature as a component of the wide content. Defense from the phenomenal content is unbeatable. The unbeatable nature of perceptual defense is compatible with the erroneous nature of perceptual ability. This notion of perceptual defense, understood in this way, is neither excused nor does it give rise to bad results and is therefore appropriate.