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随着互联网技术和交易习惯的嬗变,电子商务日益成为影响专业市场制度与技术双重转型的重要因素,专业市场的演化结局也日益成为研究者和政策制定者所关注的重点。从演化博弈的逻辑视角出发,本文突破现有多数研究非此即彼或静态的研究进路,首次将专业市场与电子商务的关系界定为一种动态融合的演化博弈过程及其结果。在此理论视域下,本文通过理论分析、模型构建、仿真模拟及案例研究,历史与逻辑地分析了专业市场与电子商务动态融合的内生性演化博弈动力机制,揭示了两者动态融合的演化博弈机制、阶段性特征、演化路径与关系模式。研究发现,专业市场与电子商务动态融合是一个受报酬递增与交易效率动态变化支配,并由演化博弈各方的合作收益、效率损失及技术成本相对变化而内生决定的多阶段多层次的演化博弈过程。由此得出的基本结论是:专业市场的发展前途并不是“真空”条件下的结局,而是一个由包括是否顺利融合了电子商务在内等诸多演化条件决定的复杂过程,二者演化博弈的结果取决于市场经营户、企业、政府、行业协会等自组织或他组织因素影响报酬递增和交易效率的相对强弱。
With the evolution of Internet technologies and transaction habits, e-commerce increasingly becomes an important factor that affects the dual transformation of systems and technologies in specialized markets. The evolution of professional markets has also increasingly become the focus of attention by researchers and policy makers. From the logical perspective of evolutionary game, this paper breaks through the existing research on most or none of these studies, and defines the relationship between professional market and e-commerce for the first time as a dynamic game evolutionary game and its outcome. From the theoretical perspective, this paper analyzes the dynamical mechanism of the endogenous evolutionary game of the dynamic convergence of the professional market and e-commerce historically and logically through theoretical analysis, model building, simulation and case studies, revealing the evolution of the dynamic convergence between the two Game Mechanisms, Staged Features, Evolutionary Paths and Relational Models. The research shows that the dynamic convergence of the professional market and e-commerce is a multi-stage and multi-level evolution that is endogenous to the dynamic changes of returns and transaction efficiency and endogenous by the evolution of cooperative game, the loss of efficiency and the relative cost of technology Game process. The basic conclusion is that the development of the professional market is not a “vacuum” under the conditions of the outcome, but by a smooth integration of e-commerce, including the evolution of many other conditions, including the decision of the complex process, both The outcome of the evolutionary game depends on the relative strength of the self-organization or other organizational factors such as market operators, enterprises, governments, industry associations, etc., which influence the increasing returns and the transaction efficiency.