本文以中国沪、深两市2002-2009年的上市公司为研究样本,通过对上市公司关联交易发生额和余额两方面的数据进行分析,研究了关联交易对薪酬契约的影响。研究发现,我国上市公司业绩和高管薪酬之间存在正相关关系,同时高管薪酬存在“粘性”特征,而关联交易的发生降低了业绩与薪酬之间的敏感性,加剧了薪酬“粘性”程度,降低了会计盈余信息的契约有效性,且这种影响只发生在关联资金往来和关联担保两大类关联交易之中,关联销售和关联购买这两类关联交易对薪酬契约有效性则没有显著影响。 Based on the sample of 2002-2009 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, China, this paper analyzes the relationship between the amount and the amount of related party transactions in listed companies, and studies the impact of related party transactions on the salary contract. The study found that the performance of listed companies in China and the relationship between executive pay there is a positive correlation between the same time, there is “sticky ” characteristics of executive pay, and the occurrence of related party transactions to reduce the sensitivity between performance and pay, exacerbating the pay “Sticky” level, reducing the contractual validity of accounting information, and this impact occurs only in the two major types of related party transactions and related party transactions, related party transactions and related party transactions related to the purchase of compensation contracts There is no significant effect on validity.