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借助一个双寡头博弈模型,本文分析了政府不同的环境税政策及企业的环保技术合作方式对企业的污染控制率、环境税率和社会福利的影响。研究结果表明:在污染物边际损害程度增加的情况下,最优环境税率呈增加态势。当边际损害程度超过一个临界值时,环境税率逐渐收敛于一个值。最优社会福利及污染控制率与最优环境税率负相关。因此,在产品完全异质时,为了实现社会福利及企业污染控制率最大化,政府应实行不承诺的环境税政策并鼓励企业RJV合作。而产品同质性较大时,承诺的环境税政策及鼓励企业的RJV合作是政府的最优选择。最后,在借助OECD部分国家环境税率成功经验的基础上,提出我国环境税改革的建议。
With a duopoly game model, this paper analyzes the impact of different government environmental tax policies and corporate environmental technology cooperation on pollution control rates, environmental tax rates and social welfare. The results show that the optimal environmental tax rate is increasing under the condition of the marginal damage of pollutants increases. When marginal damage exceeds a threshold, the environmental tax rate gradually converges to a value. The optimal social welfare and pollution control rates are negatively correlated with the optimal environmental tax rate. Therefore, when the product is completely heterogeneous, in order to maximize social welfare and corporate pollution control rates, the government should implement a non-promised environmental tax policy and encourage enterprises to cooperate with RJV. When product homogeneity is high, the promised environmental tax policy and RJV cooperation to encourage enterprises are the government’s optimal choice. Finally, based on the successful experience of environmental tax in some OECD countries, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the reform of environmental tax in China.