随着我国证券市场的不断成熟,机构投资者的规模越来越大,机构投资者基于自身资源优势和追求长期利益的考虑而积极参与公司治理从而对上市公司非效率投资产生影响。本文从委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、利益相关者理论出发分析其作用机制的理论基础。 As China’s securities market continues to mature, the size of institutional investors is getting larger and larger. Institutional investors actively participate in corporate governance based on their own resource advantages and the pursuit of long-term interests, thus affecting the inefficient investment of listed companies. This article analyzes the theoretical basis of its mechanism of action from principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory, and stakeholder theory.