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本文基于上市公司股东和经理层之间的委托代理关系,以2002～2006年526家上市公司为研究对象,从经理层对董事会控制程度、经理层激励约束机制以及总经理任职方式三个方面对上市公司现金持有的影响进行了研究。研究结果表明:经理层对董事会控制能力越强的公司会持有越多的现金;现行激励约束机制不能对经理层高现金持有的自利行为进行抑制;总经理在大股东单位任职和两职合一会使上市公司持有大量现金。
Based on the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and managers of listed companies, this article takes 526 listed companies from 2002 to 2006 as the research object, from three aspects of the level of control of the board of directors to the board of directors, the incentive and restraint mechanism of managers and the general manager’s working methods The impact of listed companies’ cash holdings was studied. The results show that the managers have more cash for the company with stronger control ability on the board of directors. The current incentive and restraint mechanism can not restrain the self-interest behaviors held by high-cash managers. The general managers hold positions in major shareholder units and two A combination of positions will make listed companies hold a lot of cash.