Viewing investment projects in new technologies as real options, this paper studies the effects ofendogenous competition and asymmetric information on the strategic exercise of real options. We firstdevelop a multi-period, game-theoretic model and show how competition leads to early exercise andaggressive investment behaviors and how competition erodes option values. We then relax the typicalfull-information assumption found in the literature and allow information asymmetry to exist acrossfirms. Our model shows, in contrast to the literature that payoff is independent of the ordering ofexercise, that the sequential exercise of real options may generate both informational and payoffexternalities. We also find some surpising but interesting results such as having more information isnot necessarily better. Viewing investment projects in new technologies as real options, this paper studies the effects ofendogenous competition and asymmetric information on the strategic exercise of real options. We firstdevelop a multi-period, game-theoretic model and show how competition leads to early exercise andaggressive investment behaviors and then competition the erodes option values. We then relax the typicalfull-information assumption found in the literature and allow information asymmetry to exist acrossfirms. Our model shows, in contrast to the literature that payoff is independent of the ordering of exercise, that the sequential exercise of real options may generate both informational and payoffexternalities. We also find some surpising but interesting results such as having more information isnot necessarily better.