论文部分内容阅读
在对中小企业的支持中,政府起着重要的引导作用,研究政府的激励措施对于解决中小企业融资难具有重要意义。本文在政府与银行组成的约束博弈关系中,引进了业务限制(逆向激励)机制,建立了政府激励下银行中小企业贷款融资激励合约三模型,讨论了奖励因子和业务限制因子的协调作用和效果。研究结果表明:在业务限制因子和奖励因子的共同作用下,政府获得期望收益最大的最优选择是奖励、业务限制同步实施的激励合约。银行在此激励合约下,会采取积极的态度,加大中小企业贷款资金投放力度,使政府与银行的利益关系实现整体协调。
In supporting SMEs, the government plays an important guiding role in studying the government’s incentive measures for solving the financing difficulties of SMEs is of great significance. This paper introduces the business limitation (reverse incentive) mechanism in the constrained game consisting of the government and the bank, and establishes a three-model of the loan financing incentive contract for the bank SMEs under the government motivation, and discusses the coordination effect and effect between the incentive factor and the business constraint factor . The results show that under the joint action of business constraints and reward factors, the optimal choice of the government to obtain the maximum expected return is the incentive contract for the simultaneous implementation of rewards and business restrictions. Under this incentive contract, banks will take a proactive approach to increasing the funding of SME loans so as to achieve overall coordination between the government and banks.