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将政府和货币当局的声誉引入动态随机一般均衡模型是本文的创新。笔者把声誉视为宏观经济管理者为整个经济体提供的一种状态,企业和家庭在这种状态下进行最大化决策。如果政府和货币当局的声誉足够高,宏观经济稳定,近似理性预期均衡实现;反之,宏观经济波动剧烈,理性预期均衡实现。本文的结论是:经济危机是政府和货币当局的诚信危机,解决危机也应从恢复诚信入手。
The introduction of the reputation of government and monetary authorities into the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is an innovation of this paper. I consider the reputation as a state of macroeconomic managers for the entire economy, enterprises and families in this state to maximize the decision-making. If the reputation of the government and monetary authorities is high enough, the macroeconomy will be stable and the approximate rational expectation will be achieved in a balanced manner. On the other hand, macroeconomic volatility and rational expectation will be balanced. The conclusion of this paper is that the economic crisis is a credit crisis of the government and monetary authorities, and the solution of the crisis should start with the restoration of integrity.