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在一些假定条件下,通过分析国际河流取水分配的特点,提炼出必要的博弈要素,并首次提出外交成本概念,尝试性地运用博弈理论建立国际河流取水分配的广义非合作二维博弈模型,根据广义非合作博弈模型Nikaido-Isoda函数,说明了该问题纳什均衡解的存在,并由此得到一阶优化条件,解得流域各国的最优河道引水量.研究表明,水资源缺乏的紧张程度决定了各国的取水策略,当水量不充足时,需要通过其他途径获得水量来弥补河道取水的不足,既有助于提高各国的用水效益,也能有效避免取水冲突.
Under some assumptions, this paper analyzes the characteristics of international water intake allocation, extracts the necessary elements of the game, first proposes the concept of diplomatic costs, and tentatively uses game theory to establish a generalized non-cooperative two-dimensional game model of international water intake allocation. According to The generalized non-cooperative game model Nikaido-Isoda function, which shows the existence of Nash equilibrium solution of the problem, and the first-order optimization conditions are obtained to solve the optimal channel water diversion in all countries in the basin.The study shows that the shortage of water resources determines the degree of tension When the amount of water is not sufficient, it is necessary to obtain water by other means to make up for the lack of water intake in the river, which not only helps to improve the water use efficiency of all countries, but also effectively avoids the conflict of water abstraction.