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本文通过一个连续异质偏好实验,在实验室中检验了投票时序对早晚投票人出席决策的影响。实验结果表明:并不能断言晚投票人比早投票人具有投票优势,早晚投票组的组间规模差异对早晚投票人的出席决策具有重要的影响,是影响早晚投票人出席的一个重要因素;投票人的投票优势不仅受投票时序的影响,还受到组间规模的影响。该实验研究结论丰富和发展了文献中关于投票时序对晚投票人信息优势和实验室支付优势影响的诸多表述。其直接应用是:在类似股东投票或董事会选举中,如果客观存在部分参与人对提案或候选人质量缺乏了解,应该存在序贯机制使其能够选择晚投票,这种机制实际上起到了强制早投票人披露信息的作用。对于那些对提案(或候选人)质量信息缺乏了解的人,晚投票有助于其收集相关信息并做出科学的决策,这一序贯投票制度安排事实上从投票信息获取方面降低了中小股东参与治理的成本。
In this paper, through a continuous heterogeneous preference experiment, we test the influence of voting timing on the attendance decision of morning and evening voters in the laboratory. The experimental results show that it is impossible to assert that the late voters have the advantage of voting than the early voters, and the difference between the groups in the morning and evening voting groups has an important influence on the decision-making of the morning and evening voters and is an important factor influencing the attendance of the morning and evening voters. The voting advantage of a person is affected not only by the timing of voting but also by the size of the group. The conclusion of this experimental study enriches and develops many references in the literature about the influence of voting timing on the advantages of late voter information and the advantages of laboratory payment. Its direct application is that in the case of similar shareholder voting or board election, there should exist a sequential mechanism to enable it to choose late vote if there is an objective part of the participants lack of understanding of the quality of the proposal or candidate, and this mechanism actually acts as a mandatory Voter’s role in disclosing information. For those who do not have a good understanding of the quality of proposals (or candidates), late voting helps them gather relevant information and make informed decisions. This sequential voting system actually reduces minority shareholders’ access to voting information The cost of participating in governance.