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本文从流通股股东与非流通股股东博弈的视角分析已股改公司的方案,发现绩平公司和绩差公司的股改博弈中存在着非公正性,得出了以前的制度安排为基金等机构投资者人为设置了一个寻租空间的结论。文章分析了存在这些问题的原因,并有针对性地提出了应采取的对策。
This paper analyzes the plan of shareholding reform from the perspective of the game between the shareholders of circulation shares and the shareholders of non-negotiable shares, and finds that there exists an unfairness in the game reform of the share-changing companies and the performance-poor companies, and draws the previous institutional arrangements for institutional investors Artificially set a rent-seeking conclusion. The article analyzes the reasons for the existence of these problems and puts forward the countermeasures that should be taken.