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如何降低供应风险是供应链管理中的热点问题。本文考虑供应商拥有关于初始可靠性的私有信息,且制造商流程改进可提高初始可靠性,运用委托代理理论,研究了制造商流程改进和采购策略联合优化下的最优合同设计。通过对比对称和不对称信息下制造商的最优采购合同,发现信息不对称的存在降低了制造商向低初始可靠性供应商订货的概率,还可能导致过度努力。信息不对称的存在不一定造成社会福利损失,也不一定产生信息租金。当供应商的初始可靠性水平和纳什谈判力满足一定条件时,相比与制造商的最优采购合同,供应商披露私有信息会使供应链实现帕累托改进。最后通过算例验证了模型的结论。本文对供应风险下的采购实践有很好的参考价值和指导意义。
How to reduce the supply risk is a hot issue in supply chain management. In this paper, we consider that the supplier owns the private information about the initial reliability, and the manufacturer process improvement can improve the initial reliability. By using principal-agent theory, the optimal contract design under the joint optimization of manufacturer process improvement and purchasing strategy is studied. By comparing the manufacturer’s optimal purchase contracts under symmetric and asymmetric information, we find that the existence of information asymmetry reduces the probability of manufacturers placing orders with low initial reliability suppliers and may also lead to over-effort. The existence of asymmetric information does not necessarily result in loss of social welfare, nor does it necessarily generate information rent. When the supplier’s initial reliability level and Nash’s bargaining power satisfy certain conditions, the supplier’s disclosure of private information will enable the supply chain to achieve Pareto improvement over the optimal purchase contract with the manufacturer. Finally, an example is used to verify the conclusion of the model. This article has a good reference value and guiding significance to the procurement practice under supply risk.