论文部分内容阅读
在考虑企业声誉激励的前提下.运用间接演化方法,提出了供应链合作伙伴(Supply Chain Partnerships,SCP)系统中企业合作偏好度的演化博弈(Evolutionary Game)模型,分析了SCP系统的内在演化机制,研究了仅与产量相关以及与产量和企业合作偏好度都相关的企业声誉激励机制对SCP系统企业合作偏好度演化稳定的影响,得到了相关的结论.
On the premise of considering the reputation incentive of enterprises, an evolutionary game model of enterprise cooperation preference in Supply Chain Partnerships (SCP) system is proposed by using indirect evolution method, and the inherent evolutionary mechanism of SCP system is analyzed , We study the influence of the enterprise reputation incentive mechanism which is only related to the output and related to the output and the degree of cooperation preference of the enterprise, on the evolution and stability of the enterprise cooperation preference of the SCP system. The related conclusions are obtained.