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文章通过构建一个双寡头两期博弈模型,将市场结构的选择内生化。以知识寻供型研发为例,研究显示,厂商之间是否会发生“研发跟进”依赖于双寡头一方的研发能力以及因研发成功而带来的产品替代性程度的变动。具体而言,一方研发能力越强,研发成功的概率越大,产品表现出来的特征差异也就越大,从而,这种正的外部性占据主导,使得另一方越没有动力进行研发跟进,甘于作为追随者,此时市场结构表现出Stackelberg双寡头模式;但是如果研发导致产品替代性程度降低不大,作为追随者利润降低的负外部性占据主导,这时就会发生研发跟进,市场结构相应地表现出cournot双寡头模式。作为比较,本文给出了社会福利角度下的最优市场结构。鉴于以上分析,最后一部分给出结论和建议。
The article constructs a two-oligopolistic two-period game model to endogenize the choice of market structure. Taking knowledge-seeking R&D as an example, studies have shown whether “research and development follow-up” between vendors will depend on the research and development capabilities of the duopoly and the degree of product substitution resulting from successful R&D. Specifically, the stronger one’s R&D capability, the greater the probability of success in research and development, and the greater the difference in the characteristics of the product. Thus, this positive externality predominates, leaving the other party with no incentive to conduct research and development follow-up. As a willing follower, the market structure at this time shows the Stackelberg duopoly model; but if R&D leads to a low degree of product substitution, negative externalities as followers’ profit reduction dominates, and R&D and follow-up will happen. The structure shows the cournot duopoly pattern accordingly. As a comparison, this paper presents the optimal market structure from the perspective of social welfare. In view of the above analysis, the final section gives conclusions and recommendations.