在国际经济关系中存在着一种奇怪的现象。虽然各国都愿意集体地致力于解决某些领域的问題,但他们却都要限定其所受的拘束。在追求这些显然互相抵触的目标时,许多国家和国际组织采用了两种主要的方法。首先,各国都要对其所承担义务的限度保留斟酌处理权。其次,他们都想避开法律义务。有时他们采用这两种方法的结合。采用这些方法达到集体行动并限定所受拘束之目标的各种规定可以被说成是“软法”。本文将阐述这样的论点,即由于当事人对义务的内容及其可要求履行性保留斟酌处理 There is a strange phenomenon in international economic relations. Although all countries are willing to work collectively to solve problems in certain fields, they all have to limit their restrictions. In pursuing these clearly conflicting goals, many countries and international organizations have adopted two main approaches. First of all, all countries should reserve discretion to limit the extent of their obligations. Second, they all want to avoid legal obligations. Sometimes they use a combination of these two methods. The various provisions that use these methods to achieve collective action and to limit the objectives of the restraint can be said to be “soft law.” This essay will address the argument that since the parties deal with the content of the obligation and its enforceability reservation