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以2008年的金融危机为契机,本文考察了危机冲击如何影响投资者的信息解读,并结合危机冲击对公司信息披露的影响,进一步分析了在危机冲击下投资者信息解读的合理性。结果表明,在危机冲击下,投资者更倾向于将可操纵性应计盈余理解成管理者机会主义行为的结果,而不是管理者向市场传递未来现金流信患的一种工具,从而降低了可操纵性应计盈余的价值相关性。并且,当公司属于非国有企业或者非管制行业时,将有利于减弱危机冲击对投资者信息解读的负面影响;同时,结合危机冲击对公司信息披露的影响,本文进一步的分析表明,在金融危机的冲击下,公司并未披露更低质量的会计盈余。这说明,在危机冲击下,投资者对可操纵性应计盈余的估值更低,不是因为盈余质量更差,在很大程度上是因为市场低迷的悲观情绪影响了投资者对盈余信息的解读;并且,这种影响既不利于投资者适当地对公司进行估价,也将影响资本市场的资源配置效率。
Taking the financial crisis in 2008 as an opportunity, this paper examines how the crisis impact on investors ’information interpretation and the impact of crisis impact on the company’s information disclosure, further analyzes the rationality of investors’ information interpretation under the impact of crisis. The results show that investors are more likely to interpret discretionary accruals as a result of managers opportunistic behavior than crisis managers and not as a tool for managers to deliver future cash flow information to the market, The relevance of the value of the actuarial surplus. Moreover, when the company belongs to non-state-owned enterprises or unregulated industries, it will help reduce the negative impact of the crisis impact on investor information interpretation. At the same time, combined with the impact of crisis impact on the company’s information disclosure, further analysis shows that in the financial crisis Under the impact of the company did not disclose lower quality accounting earnings. This shows that under the impact of the crisis, investors ’valuations of discretionary accruals are not lower because of the poorer earnings quality, in large part because the gloomy market sentiment has affected investors’ Interpretation; and, this effect is not conducive to investors properly appraise the company, but also will affect the efficiency of resource allocation in capital markets.