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考虑回购激励、延迟支付和批发价等多种契约机制以及破产风险因素,研究了供应商和资金约束零售商组成的二级供应链中商业信用融资与营运投资的综合协调决策问题。文章比较分析了集中决策下资金约束零售商分别选择商业信用融资和银行贷款时供应链的最优采购量策略,并基于自身利润最大化的经济行为假设,研究了分散决策下处于Stackelberg博弈主导地位的供应商运用多个契约设计实现供应链联合利润和自身利润最优。研究表明,供应链集中决策情形下,无多余自由现金的供应商从银行贷款为零售商提供商业信用比零售商自身从银行贷款创造的供应链价值更高;供应链分散决策情形下,供应商可以通过商业信用和回购激励与零售商分担存货融资成本及存货需求不确定性风险,激励零售商订购与集中决策时集成供应链相同的最优采购量,且供应商可以通过批发价策略调整供应链联合利润的分享比例。最后,通过算例对研究结论进行了验证,并提出了管理启示。
Considering various contractual mechanisms such as repurchase incentives, deferred payments and wholesale prices and the risk factors of bankruptcy, this paper studies the comprehensive coordination and decision-making of commercial credit financing and operating investment in the two-level supply chain consisting of suppliers and capital-constrained retailers. This paper compares the optimal procurement strategy of retailers with capital constraints under the centralized decision-making in the supply chain when they choose commercial credit financing and bank loans respectively. Based on the economic behavior hypothesis of maximizing their own profit, this paper studies the domination of Stackelberg game under decentralized decision-making Of suppliers use multiple contracts to design the supply chain joint profit and self-profit optimal. The research shows that in the case of centralized decision-making in supply chain, suppliers with no surplus free cash provide more commercial credit to retailers from bank loans than retailers create from their own bank loans. In the case of decentralized supply chain, suppliers The commercial credit and repo incentives can be used to share the inventory financing cost and the uncertainty of inventory demand with the retailer to motivate the retailer to order the same optimal purchase volume as the integrated supply chain in the centralized decision making and the supplier can adjust the wholesale price strategy Supply chain joint profit sharing ratio. Finally, a case study is carried out to validate the research findings and propose management implications.