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在目前我国个人信用制度尚不完善的背景下,助学贷款信用体系的全面实施和发展还受到诸多制约,助学贷款的供求矛盾十分突出。一方面,不断出现的到期贷款违约现象已经开始影响到银行进一步放贷的积极性。贷款规模的不足使财政用于贴息的资金大部分闲置在账上;另一方面,高校扩招、贫困生增加不断扩大着对助学贷款的进一步需求。本文拟运用博弈论的方法分析在助学货款实施的过程中,银行和学生贷款人在无约束条件下、家庭担保条件下和个人信用制度约束条件下双方的动态博弈过程,并得出家庭担保贷款是短期内最有效的助学贷款制度安排,而个人信用体系建立是中长期最有效的助学贷款制度安排。
Under the background of the imperfect personal credit system in our country, the full implementation and development of the student loan credit system are also subject to many constraints. The contradiction between supply and demand of student loans is very prominent. On the one hand, the emerging phenomenon of default on expired loans has begun to affect the enthusiasm of banks to further lend. The lack of loan size makes most of the funds used by the government for discounting lie idle. On the other hand, the expansion of enrollment in colleges and universities and the increasing number of poor students continue to expand the demand for student loans. This paper intends to use game theory to analyze the dynamic game process of both parties under the conditions of unconstrained, family guarantee and personal credit under the constraints of bank loans and student loans, Loans are the most effective institutional arrangements for student loans in the short term, and the establishment of an individual credit system is the most effective long-term system of student loans.