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本文提出,知识财产与一般财产的紧密联系,源于信息成本在界定和实施排他权中发挥的重要作用。正如很多学者强调的,信息的非竞争性导致知识财产的排他权在阻止他人使用上比有形财产的成本更高。可是即便知识产权没有解决分配问题,它仍可以让那些发现、利用信息的人占有竞争性投入的奖励。从成本的角度,排他权是一个潜在的捷径:信息排他权能简单地,非直接地、低成本地解决从竞争性投入中获得收益的问题。本文建立在排他和治理为界定产权之互补性策略的框架上,并提出哪些因素倾向于排他策略、哪些因素则相反的若干命题。排他权在信息权利系统中所发挥的作用——允许信息隐藏在隐喻的边界之后——既是其长处,也是短处。由于排他权会随着互联信息价值的提高而愈发昂贵、更有价值,我们是否应当期待更多的排他以及更多的排他是否可欲,这是一个实证问题。本文用信息-成本理论来解释类侵权的著作权与类财产权的专利权之间的一些基本区别。信息-成本理论也为权利结构的实证证据提供些许支持,例如商业组织规则。知识财产,和普通财产一样,可以被视为解决根据投入分配产出这一复杂协调问题的(最多算是)次优的方案。
This paper proposes that the close connection between intellectual property and general property stems from the important role that information cost plays in defining and implementing exclusive rights. As many scholars have emphasized, the non-competition of information leads to the exclusive rights of intellectual property to prohibit others from using it more than the cost of tangible property. But even if intellectual property does not solve the distribution problem, it can still reward those who find and use information for competitive input. From a cost perspective, exclusivity is a potential shortcut: Information exclusivity is a simple, indirect and low-cost solution to the problem of gaining from competitive inputs. This article builds on the framework of exclusiveness and governance as complementary strategies for defining property rights, and proposes some propositions that tend to be exclusive and what are the opposite. The role of exclusive rights in the system of information rights - allowing information to be hidden behind metaphorical boundaries - is both its strengths and weaknesses. As exclusivity becomes more expensive and valuable as the value of connected information increases, it is an empirical question whether we should expect more exclusiveness and more exclusivity. This paper uses the information-cost theory to explain some basic differences between copyright infringement and patent infringement. The information-cost theory also provides some support for the empirical evidence of the structure of rights, such as the rules of business organizations. Intellectual property, like ordinary property, can be seen as a (at best) sub-optimal solution to the complex coordination problem of allocating inputs and outputs.