本文实证研究并比较了改革开放前后中国地方财政激励强度的动态特征。文章发现,1980年开始的分权化改革显著地提升了地方财政激励的强度,这一特征并没有因税制调整和大规模的垂直转移支付而改变;并且,分税制改革进一步强化了而不是削弱了地方财政激励。这意味着,至少在经济利益上,地方政府(官员)有很高的积极性推动经济增长,这为中国地方政府之所以展开为增长(而不是为租金)的竞争提供了一种解释。 This paper empirically studies and compares the dynamic characteristics of China’s local fiscal incentives intensity before and after the reform and opening up. The article found that decentralization reforms that began in 1980 significantly increased the intensity of local fiscal incentives that did not change as a result of tax reform and large-scale vertical transfer payments; and that the tax-sharing reform was further strengthened rather than weakened Local financial incentives. This means that, at least for economic benefits, local governments (officials) have a high incentive to promote economic growth, providing an explanation for why Chinese local governments are competing for growth rather than rent.