一、税收政策与微观基础的矛盾 税收是国家财力的基本来源,也是财政政策的有力的政策手段。然而,1987年全国国有企业普遍推行承包经营责任制后的几年实践表明,现行承包制与税收政策产生了明显的摩擦:从静态效果看,利税承包的确在现有水平上部分达到了稳定财政收入的目的;但从长期的、动态的效果看,利税承包既包死了企业,也包死了税收。 首先,企业利税承包不能负亏,这是因为承包者不可能对巨大的国有资产真正负责。近年来,亏损企业数及亏损总额连年上升,1991年独立核算的国有工业企业亏损总额达367亿元,占其利税总额的22％,成为国家财政的巨大负担。 其次,人们常说利税承包负盈不负亏,实际上,其“负盈”能力也是有限的。利税承包在一定的有限的范围内,可以使国有企业发挥其部分生产潜力,但超出这一范围,承包又限制了生产潜力的充分发挥。下面我们可以证明这一点:目前一般通用的利税承包是根据企业利润的历史 First, the tax policy and the micro-based contradictions Tax is the basic source of state financial resources, but also a powerful policy instruments of fiscal policy. However, the practice carried out by state-owned enterprises in 1987 after implementing the responsibility system of contracting management in general shows that there is a clear friction between the current contracting system and the tax policy: from the static effect, the contracting of profits and taxes has, at the current level, partially achieved a stable fiscal The purpose of income; but from the long-term, dynamic effect, the tax contract contains both the dead business and the tax dead. First of all, enterprises can not afford to lose profits and tax contracting, it is because contractors can not truly responsible for the huge state-owned assets. In recent years, the total number of loss-making enterprises and total losses has risen year after year. In 1991, the state-owned industrial enterprises independently accounted for a total loss of 36.7 billion yuan, accounting for 22% of the total profits and taxes, which became a huge financial burden on the state. Second, people often say that profit tax contracting is not a loss. In fact, its ability to “negative profit” is also limited. In a certain limited scope, profits and taxes can enable state-owned enterprises to exert part of their productive potential. However, beyond this scope, contracting has limited the full development of productive potential. Below we can prove this: The current general tax contract is based on the history of corporate profits