注意到伴随《指导意见》和股权分置改革而来的政策性扰动对大股东制衡行为的影响,文章选择2000-2008年中国市场的经验证据,从第二类代理问题出发,细致刻画上市公司前五大股东间的制衡行为,并讨论前两大股东的勾结行为,研究大股东制衡机制对董事会独立性的重要作用。 Noting the influence of the policy disturbances caused by the “Guiding Opinions” and the non-tradable share reform on the checks and balances of major shareholders, this paper selects the empirical evidence of the Chinese market from 2000 to 2008 and sets out from the second type of agency problems that the listed companies Checks and balances among the top five shareholders, discusses the collusion behavior of the two largest shareholders, and studies the important role of the check and balance mechanism of major shareholders on the independence of the board of directors.