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经济学家们已经对佃农分成理论进行了深入的研究,无论是规范分析还是实证检验的研究成果都相当丰富。本文通过收集中国历史案例来解释分成制度的存在性,从而推导出理性人在局限条件下争取利益最大化的模型假说,总结出可被事实推翻的一般性经济学含义:预期未来产销量与价格的信息费用高,只是选择分成契约的必要条件。本文的模型进一步证明,在信息不对称条件下,地主与佃农之间关于租金分成跨期博弈的精练贝叶斯纳什均衡可转化为技术水平与异质性劳动能力的匹配状态。最后,该模型把曾经盛行于广东珠三角地区的自梳女安排解释为自梳女与家庭成员之间关于家庭资源租金的分成契约。
Economists have conducted an in-depth study on the share-sharing theory of tenant farmers, and the research results of both normative analysis and empirical testing are quite rich. This article explains the existence of the separation system by collecting historical cases in China, and deduces a model hypothesis of rational individuals seeking maximum benefits under limited conditions. It summarizes the general economic meaning that can be overthrown by facts: the expected future sales volume and price The high cost of information, only the choice of the necessary conditions into the contract. The model in this paper further proves that under the condition of information asymmetry, the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium between landowners and tenant farmers about the inter-period game of rent sharing can be transformed into the match between technological level and heterogeneous working ability. Finally, the model interprets the self-combating women’s arrangement, once prevalent in the Pearl River Delta of Guangdong, as a share-based contract between self-combing women and family members about rent of family resources.