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按照拉丰和马赫蒂摩(2002)的观点,赋予风险中性的代理人以利润的剩余索取权,是对道德风险问题的最优解决。在委托人与代理人无限期重复合作的情况下,这种做法是可行的。但是,这也表明了委托—代理理论的局限性:当代理人受到高能产权激励时,他对资产的使用漫不经心或过度使用,会导致委托人的资产在长期中的价值下降,而代理人却无须为此承担责任。实际上,这种剩余索取权激励只是高能产权激励的必要条件。高能产权激励的充分条件是市场竞争。独立企业所面临的产权激励属于高能产权激励。当这种产权激励与外部竞争压力相结合时,将使一个独立的企业比它作为一体化企业的一个部门具有更高的效率。纵向准一体化的理论基础是竞争市场条件下的高能产权激励。
According to Lafon and Mahtimomo (2002), the claim of residual claims of profits for risk-neutral agents is the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem. This is feasible where the principal and the agent repeat their cooperation indefinitely. However, this also shows the limitations of the principal-agent theory: when an agent is motivated by high-energy property rights, his careless or overuse of the asset can result in a decrease in the value of the principal’s asset in the long run, whereas the agent Do not have to take responsibility for this. In fact, this residual claim incentive is only a necessary condition for incentives for high-energy property rights. The sufficient condition for stimulating high-energy property rights is market competition. Property rights incentives that independent firms face are incentives for high-energy property rights. When this incentive to property rights is combined with external competitive pressures, it will make an independent enterprise more efficient than it is a division of an integrated enterprise. The theoretical basis of vertical quasi-integration is incentive of high-energy property under competitive market conditions.