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现有证券分析师跟进与盈余管理关系的文献基本都以应计盈余管理为对象,缺少以另外一种重要的盈余管理方式——真实盈余管理为对象的研究成果。以2004—2011年的中国上市公司为研究样本,考察了分析师跟进、终极控制人性质对应计及真实盈余管理行为选择的影响,以弥补现有研究的不足。研究结果发现,分析师跟进与真实盈余管理显著负相关,与应计盈余管理显著正相关,因此尽管分析师跟进能显著抑制中国上市公司的真实盈余管理行为,但这会导致公司转而采用应计项目操纵手段来实现盈余目标。按照终极控制人性质的分组检验结果表明,相对于国有控股上市公司,在非国有控股上市公司中分析师跟进抑制真实盈余管理行为的作用更强。
The existing literature of securities analysts following the relationship with earnings management basically takes accrual earnings management as the object, but lacks the research result of another kind of important earnings management - real earnings management. Taking the Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2011 as the research samples, this paper examines the impact of analyst follow-up and ultimate controller nature on the choice of true earnings management behavior to make up for the deficiencies of the existing research. The findings show that analyst follow-up is significantly negatively correlated with real earnings management and significantly positively correlated with accruals earnings management, so while analyst follow-up can significantly inhibit the real earnings management practices of China’s listed companies, this can lead to a switch to Use accruals to manipulate means to achieve the profit target. The result of group test based on the nature of the ultimate controller shows that compared with the state-controlled listed companies, analysts follow the trend of restraining the real earnings management in the non-state-controlled listed companies.