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很多国内外的理论与实证研究都表明,股权激励对于改善委托-代理问题有显著的正效应,但也有学者指出股权激励容易诱发管理层的机会主义行为。本文分析了上市公司管理层进行机会主义行为的动机、方式及时间节点,认为管理层在股权激励实施中的各个阶段都有进行机会主义行为的可能,并就此提出完善我国股权激励制度的政策建议。
Many domestic and foreign theoretical and empirical studies have shown that equity incentive has a significant positive effect on the improvement of the principal-agent problem. However, some scholars point out that equity incentive can easily induce opportunistic management behavior. This paper analyzes the motivation, methods and time nodes of listed companies’ opportunistic behavior. It holds that the management has the possibility to carry out opportunistic behavior in all stages of the implementation of equity incentive and proposes some suggestions on how to improve the equity incentive system in our country .