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高管薪酬激励并不一定是解决代理问题的有效工具,可能会导致经理人严重的短视行为。金融危机之后,各国政府对高管薪酬实施管制,以期将高管薪酬与公司长期绩效进行捆绑,但是影响高管薪酬的一个重要因素是市场压力进而产生的高管短视行为并没有引起国内学者的足够重视。这为本文提供了研究动机,即选取中国上市公司样本从薪酬的角度探讨以剩余薪酬衡量的高管短视与公司风险承担之间的关系。研究发现,剩余薪酬能够显著增加公司风险承担行为,并且基于政府的保护,国有企业风险承担行为变动程度显著大于民营企业。
Executive compensation incentives are not necessarily effective tools to solve the agency problem, which may lead to serious short-sighted managers behavior. After the financial crisis, the governments of all countries control the executive compensation in order to bundle the executive compensation with the long-term performance of the company. However, one of the important factors that affect the executive compensation is that the market pressure and the resulting short-sighted executives did not cause the domestic scholars Pay enough attention. This provides the research motivation for this article, that is, to select the sample of Chinese listed companies to explore the relationship between the executive’s short-term and the company’s risk-taking as measured by the remuneration from the salary point of view. The study found that the remuneration can significantly increase the company’s risk-taking behavior, and based on government protection, the degree of risk-taking behavior of state-owned enterprises is significantly greater than that of private-owned enterprises.