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基于官员激励机制视角,分析了政府官员在有限任期内对辖区企业研发(R&D)投入产生影响的作用机制。由于R&D指标于2000年首次纳入“十五”计划,对2000-2012年的企业R&D投入与省级官员任期的检验结果显示,企业R&D投入与官员任期呈现显著的倒U型关系,企业R&D投入在官员任期内先增加后下降。进一步检验发现,企业R&D投入来源中政府资金部分与官员任期同样存在倒U型关系,而银行信贷部分与官员任期的关系并不显著,说明官员主要通过动用财政补贴对辖区企业R&D投入施加影响。官员任期的影响会继续传导至企业的R&D产出和效率,而对比检验1990-1999年数据显示,官员任期对企业R&D投入的影响在“十五”计划实施之前并不显著。
Based on the perspective of the incentive mechanism of officials, this paper analyzes the mechanism of government officials’ influence on R & D investment in their jurisdictions for a limited period of time. As the R & D index was first included in the “Tenth Five-Year Plan” in 2000, the test on the R & D investment of enterprises and the provincial officials’ term from 2000 to 2012 shows that there is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between corporate R & D investment and official tenure. R & D investment increased first and then decreased during official tenure. Further tests found that the source of government R & D investment in the government funds part of the official term there is inverted U-shaped relationship, and bank credit and official tenure of the relationship is not significant, indicating that officials mainly through the use of financial subsidies on the area of R & D investment exert influence. The influence of officials’ tenure will continue to be linked to the R & D output and efficiency of enterprises, while the comparative test data from 1990 to 1999 show that the impact of official tenure on firm R & D investment is not significant before the implementation of the “Tenth Five-year Plan”.