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基于一个单期空间竞争框架,从信贷甄别视角出发,将为传统理论所忽略的借款人风险内生分布对甄别效率的影响纳入分析,明晰市场竞争对银行风险的作用机制和临界条件。研究发现:市场竞争的风险影响取决于甄别投入效应与甄别效率效应的共同作用。前者会刺激银行的风险水平,而后者则有益于机构的风险平抑。当贷款需求价格弹性偏低时,甄别效率效应占优,竞争与银行风险反向关联。这启示监管当局为控制日趋激烈的市场竞争格局下的信贷风险隐患,在强化银行事前甄别机制的同时,应注重引导信贷产品创新,优化价格的信贷资源配置功能,从而双管齐下,提升甄别活动效能。
Based on a single-period space competition framework, from the perspective of credit screening, the author analyzes the impact of endogenous risk distribution of the borrower neglected by the traditional theory on the screening efficiency and clarifies the mechanism and critical conditions of the market competition on bank risk. The research finds that the risk impact of market competition depends on the interaction between screening input effect and screening efficiency effect. The former will stimulate the bank’s risk level, while the latter will benefit the institutional risk control. When the price elasticity of loan demand is low, the screening efficiency effect is dominant, and competition and bank risk are inversely related. This suggests that in order to control the hidden risks of credit risks under the increasingly fierce market competition, the supervisory authority should pay attention to guiding credit product innovation and optimizing the allocation of credit resources at a competitive price while enhancing the pre-bank screening mechanism so as to achieve a two-pronged approach and enhance the effectiveness of screening activities.