该文借助DEA-Tobit面板数据模型,考察在中国式分权的制度背景下地方官员自利行为是如何影响环境治理效率的。结论是:1)财政分权与地方政府环境治理效率之间为负相关关系;2)地方官员自利行为大大降低了辖区的环境治理效率;3)从中国式分权与地方官员自利行为对环境治理效率的相互影响看,两者间的交互项回归系数的绝对值远远大于财政分权回归系数的绝对值,表明中国式分权在地方官员自利行为的叠加影响下严重削弱了政府的环境治理效率。 This paper uses DEA-Tobit panel data model to examine how self-serving behavior of local officials affects the efficiency of environmental governance in the context of Chinese decentralization. The conclusion is: 1) there is a negative correlation between fiscal decentralization and the efficiency of local government environmental governance; 2) the self-interest of local officials greatly reduces the efficiency of environmental governance in the area; 3) from the Chinese decentralization and self-interest of local officials The mutual effect of environmental governance efficiency shows that the absolute value of the regression coefficient between the two is far greater than the absolute value of the coefficient of fiscal decentralization, indicating that the Chinese decentralization severely weakened under the superposition of local officials’ self- Government’s environmental governance efficiency.