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通过回购契约机制促使零售商和银行开展存货质押融资业务是供应链金融常见的模式之一。传统的Stackelberg主从博弈方法研究表明,银行和零售商的预期收益是关于回购率的增函数,供应商的预期收益是关于回购率的减函数,且参与方的最优回购定价是以银行和零售商占主导地位制定的,这使得位于从属地位和信息末端的供应商必须制定满足银行和零售商的最优定价但不符合参与合作个体理性的原则。因此,应构建Nash协商下的回购契约机制模型。研究表明,该模型下的回购定价,能使供应商遵循激励和理性原则,同时参与者的谈判和议价能力能达到协商均衡。
It is one of the common modes of supply chain finance that retailers and banks should be encouraged to carry out inventory collateral financing business through repurchase contract mechanism. The traditional Stackelberg game shows that the expected return of banks and retailers is an increasing function of the repo rate, the expected return of the supplier is a decreasing function of the repo rate, and the optimal repo pricing of the participants is The dominance of banks and retailers has led to the need for suppliers at the bottom of subordination and information to set the principle of meeting the optimal pricing of banks and retailers without meeting the individual rationality of participating in the cooperation. Therefore, a model of repo contract mechanism should be constructed under Nash negotiation. The research shows that under the model, repo pricing can enable suppliers to follow the principle of motivation and rationality, and the negotiation and bargaining power of participants can achieve a balanced negotiation.