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机构投资者拥有雄厚资金以及丰富的管理经验,其持股数量越大,选择长期投资策略也更加有利可图,促使其更有动力通过征集代理投票权、行使投票权等方式参与公司治理,这在一定程度上能够有效抑制上市公司大股东的“掏空”行为。然而,为了对公司的重大决策施加影响,将不可避免地产生公司控股股东与机构投资者的征集代理投票权之争。征集代理投票权制度在我国公司法律制度中尚处于初期发展阶段,且由于我国对征集代理投票权的规定的内容不完备且存在矛盾,本文有必要对此进行一些理论结合实例的讨论,旨在促进机构投资者更好地对上市公司进行监督。
Institutional investors have abundant capital and rich management experience. The larger the number of shares they hold, the more profitable the long-term investment strategy, which makes them more motivated to participate in corporate governance by soliciting proxy voting rights and exercising voting rights. To a certain extent, effectively curb the “hollowing out” behavior of large shareholders of listed companies. However, in order to exert influence on a company’s major decisions, it will inevitably result in a dispute over the voting rights of the proxy between the controlling shareholder of the company and the institutional investors. The system of soliciting agency voting rights is still in its initial stage of development in the legal system of the company in our country. And because of the incomplete and contradictory provisions of our country’s provisions on the solicitation of proxy voting rights, it is necessary to discuss some of the theoretical and practical examples in this paper, Promote institutional investors to better monitor listed companies.