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在制造业企业成本控制活动中,管理者和生产型员工间产生了委托代理问题,并由此签订成本控制契约。由于员工敬业行为对其成本控制业绩产生着影响,因而将敬业度引入成本控制契约,研究了员工成本控制能力、努力成本和管理者精神激励成本等变量对员工最优风险分担、敬业度、努力程度和管理者最优收益的影响。研究结果表明:最优风险分担系数和本职最优努力水平、员工成本控制能力呈正相关,与努力成本、风险偏好程度、风险方差呈负相关;最优行为敬业度和最优额外努力水平与员工能力呈正相关,与努力成本、管理者精神激励成本呈负相关;最优总努力水平和管理者最优收益与员工能力、特质敬业度呈正相关,与努力成本、风险偏好程度、风险方差、管理者精神激励成本呈负相关。
In the cost control activities of manufacturing enterprises, the problem of principal-agent arises between managers and production employees, and the contract of cost control is signed accordingly. Since employee dedication has an impact on its cost control performance, the engagement is introduced into the contract of cost control, and the optimal risk sharing, dedication and effort of employees are researched on variables such as employee cost control ability, effort cost and manager incentive cost The degree and the manager’s optimal return. The results show that the optimal risk-sharing coefficient is positively correlated with the level of employee’s own optimal effort and employee cost control, and is negatively correlated with the cost of effort, risk preference and risk variance. The optimal behavior engagement and the optimal extra effort are the same as those of employees Ability and ability, the incentive cost of managers was negatively correlated; the optimal level of total effort and managers ’optimal return were positively correlated with employees’ abilities, specialty dedication, and work cost, risk preference, risk variance, management Incentive costs were negatively related.