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以2004～2006年的非金融类上市公司为样本,考察了债务融资及其结构对大股东利益侵占行为的影响,从而揭示出我国上市公司中股东—债权人冲突和负债作为治理机制所带来的经济后果。研究结果显示,虽然债务融资总体上对大股东侵占行为没有治理效果,但债务融资中的银行债务及短期借款能够对大股东的利益侵占行为起到一定的抑制作用。按最终控制人性质进行分组检验的结果表明,商业信用、银行债务与短期借款在非国有控股公司中能够对大股东的利益侵占行为起到更好的治理作用,而长期债务在非国有控股公司和国有控股公司中不但没有起到治理作用,反而加剧了大股东的利益侵占。
Taking the non-financial listed companies from 2004 to 2006 as samples, this paper examines the impact of debt financing and its structure on the encroachment of major shareholders, revealing the conflict between shareholders and creditors and liabilities as a governance mechanism in China’s listed companies Economic consequences. The results show that although debt financing generally has no governance effect on the major shareholders’ encroachment, the bank debt and short-term loans in debt financing can restrain the majority shareholder’s interests encroachment. According to the nature of ultimate controller, the result of grouping test shows that commercial credit, bank debt and short-term borrowing can play a better governance role in the non-state-owned holding company’s interests encroachment on large shareholders, while long-term debt in non-state-owned holding company And state-owned holding companies not only failed to play a governing role, but aggravate the interests of major shareholders encroachment.