论文部分内容阅读
以往考察管理层持股与公司业绩的研究均没有考虑产品市场竞争程度的影响,而超产权理论认为,产品市场竞争是公司业绩改善的根本保证。为此,通过构建动态面板数据模型,采用DIF-GMM估计方法,以我国沪、深两市2011—2014年的A股上市公司为研究样本,探讨了产品市场竞争对管理层持股与公司业绩的影响。研究发现:产品市场竞争对管理层持股的激励效果具有显著影响,产品市场竞争程度越高,管理层持股的激励效果越好;产品市场竞争程度越低,管理层持股的激励效果越差。
In the past, the research on management shareholding and corporate performance did not consider the impact of product market competition, and the theory of excess property rights holds that product market competition is the fundamental guarantee for the company’s performance improvement. To this end, through the construction of dynamic panel data model, the use of DIF-GMM estimation method, Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2011-2014, A-share listed companies as a sample to explore the product market competition for management and corporate performance shareholdings Impact. The results show that: the product market competition has a significant impact on the incentive effect of the management shareholding; the higher the product market competition, the better the incentive effect of the management shareholding; the lower the product market competition, the incentive effect of the management shareholding difference.