论文部分内容阅读
在公司治理框架下,经理有动机且可以利用所掌握的权力对其报酬水平施加影响。由于败德行为成本的约束,领导权理论认为经理并不会公然地采取操纵行为,而是将某些操纵报酬行为隐藏起来。从败德行为成本视角出发,本文对经理隐藏行为的具体模式与内在动因进行分析,以厘清当前在经理报酬领域中存在的一些困惑之处,以期为完善公司治理机制、特别是经理报酬决定机制提供参考。
Under a corporate governance framework, managers are motivated and can use the power they have to influence their pay levels. Due to the constraint of the cost of bad morality, the theory of leadership does not think the manager will take the blatant manipulation but hide some manipulative reward. From the perspective of the moral hazard cost, this paper analyzes the specific patterns and intrinsic motivation of the hidden behavior managers to clarify the current confusion in the field of managers some puzzling place, in order to improve the corporate governance mechanism, in particular, the mechanism for determining the reward of managers for reference.