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代理人通过操纵信息来实现机会主义的行为已受到持久关注,本研究则考察在审计意见出具的过程中,审计双方不改变信息,但加重对自身更有利的指标的影响力的行为。以中国上市公司为样本的检验结果表明,会计业绩和市场回报都对审计意见具有解释力,当市场回报在同行业内相对于会计业绩的排序位置越差,其对审计意见的影响力也越大,同时,并没有证据表明,客户加强了表现较好的业绩指标的影响力。结果表明,表现较差的指标对审计意见的影响力得到增强,这可能源于审计方对执业风险的重视。进一步的测试表明,重构的效果随着公司业务复杂度的提升而下降,说明复杂的经营环境削弱了审计方的重构能力。综合结论为审计方的权效重构行为提供了经验证据。
An agent’s opportunistic behavior through manipulation of information has received constant attention. This study investigates the act of auditing both parties’ influence on information without increasing their influence over their more favorable indicators during the issuance of the audit opinion. The test results of the listed companies in China show that both the accounting performance and the market return have the power to explain the audit opinion. When the market returns are ranked worse than the accounting performance in the same industry, the influence on the audit opinion is greater, At the same time, there is no evidence that customers have strengthened the impact of better-performing performance indicators. The results show that the performance of poor performance indicators on the audit opinion has been enhanced, which may be derived from the auditor’s emphasis on practice risk. Further tests show that the effect of the refactoring declines with the complexity of the company’s business, indicating that the complex business environment undermines the auditor’s ability to refactor. The comprehensive conclusion provides empirical evidence for the auditor’s reconstitution of rights and interests.