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“存在”这一概念极易误导人们对于海德格尔思想的理解。立足于从“存在”到“意义”的现象学还原,我们有理由认为,当海德格尔谈论存在时,他谈的是现象学意义上的意义。这一解释可以在早期海德格尔关于事实状态(Faktizitat)和后期海德格尔关于Ereignis的论述中得到印证和理解。事实状态和Ereignis说的是一回事:保持意义-给予过程的敞开。鉴于“存在”在海德格尔研究文献中的长期使用,本文将首先澄清海德格尔在何种意义上使用“存在”一词,并根据这一澄清重新解释世界、真、Ereignis、事实状态等重要概念。
The concept of “existence” can easily mislead people’s understanding of Heidegger’s thought. Based on the phenomenological reduction from “existence ” to “meaning ”, we have reason to think that when Heidegger talks about existence, he talks about the significance of phenomenology. This explanation can be confirmed and understood in the earlier Heidegger’s account of Faktizitat and later Heidegger’s Ereignis. The factual status and Ereignis say the same thing: to keep meaning - to give the process open. In the light of the long-term use of “existing ” in Heidegger’s research literature, this article will first clarify in what sense Heidegger uses the term “existence” and reinterpret the world, truth, Ereignis , Factual status and other important concepts.