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有学者认为,美国政府应对第一次台海危机的决策缺乏具体设想、连贯性和明确性,其“危机处理”是“兵来将挡、水来土掩”的临时决策。而本文从宏观战略和具体政策的关系角度出发,探讨第一次台海危机中关国对台政策的调整问题,得出如下结论:朝鲜战争结束后,美国为实现“保台遏共”的宏观战略,已针对台海局势采取一系列措施;第一次台海危机使美国调整了这些政策,以继续推行“保台遏共”的战略。美国在此次危机后形成的对台政策既有暂时性,也有长期性,可谓是长期措施和权宜之计的统一。
Some scholars believe that the U.S. government lacks concrete ideas, coherence and clarity in its decision-making on the first crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The “crisis management” is an interim decision-making for “soldiers will block and water will come to a rude”. This paper, from the perspective of the relationship between macroeconomic and specific policies, explores the adjustment of the country’s policy toward Taiwan in the first Taiwan Strait crisis and concludes as follows: After the Korean War ended, the United States realized “ The macroeconomic strategy of the Taiwan Strait has taken a series of measures against the situation in the Taiwan Strait. The first crisis in the Taiwan Strait caused the United States to readjust these policies so as to continue to implement the strategy of ”co-opting Taiwan together." The U.S. policy on Taiwan formed after this crisis is both temporary and long-term. It can be described as the unification of long-term measures and expediency.