论文部分内容阅读
基于网络分析法,本文考察了高管是否通过企业间相互兼职传导盈余操纵行为,以及公司治理因素的调节作用。以2012-2014年A股上市公司2394个数据为样本,研究结果表明,盈余质量较低的企业,其联结企业的盈余质量也显著偏低,而盈余质量较高的联结企业之间盈余质量没有显著的相关性,说明盈余操纵只是在低盈余质量的企业之间通过高管联结传导。另外,高管持股、提高独立董事比例、股权集中和控制机构投资者持股比例能有效抑制联结企业之间盈余质量的趋同,起到防止会计信息操纵在企业间扩散的“防火墙”作用。
Based on the network analysis method, this paper examines whether senior executives conduct earnings manipulation through part-time work between enterprises and the regulatory role of corporate governance. Taking the 2394 data of A-share listed companies in 2012-2014 as a sample, the results show that the earnings quality of enterprises with lower earnings quality is significantly lower, while the earnings quality of the connected enterprises with higher earnings quality is not The significant correlation shows that earnings manipulation is only mediated through executive ties among firms with low earnings quality. In addition, senior executives holding shares, increasing the proportion of independent directors, concentration of ownership and controlling the proportion of institutional investors can effectively curb the convergence of the quality of the earnings between enterprises, and prevent the spread of accounting information among enterprises. effect.