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建立存款保险制度的目的是保护存款人和维护金融稳定,但存款保险究竟是降低还是提高了系统性风险,答案不一而足。在存款保险制度存在的情况下,由于约束与激励与存款保险制度紧密联系的各种利益相关者的机制发生了变化,这为与存款保险制度相关的道德风险提供了存在的土壤。如何有效地降低道德风险已经成了各国在设计或完善本国存款保险制度时着重关注的热点和难点问题。于2015年5月生效的《存款保险条例》标志着中国存款保险制度的正式建立。此时,深入研究和分析存款保险制度中道德风险产生的原因、危害以及实践中采取的规制措施,从法律的视角对中国《存款保险条例》中的道德风险进行评析,有助于进一步完善和实施中国的存款保险制度,加速推进利率市场化、民营银行的准入以及商业银行破产法的出台。
The purpose of establishing a deposit insurance system is to protect depositors and maintain financial stability. However, whether deposit insurance reduces or increases systemic risk has many answers. With the existence of deposit insurance system, the mechanism of various stakeholders constrained and motivated by the deposit insurance system has changed. This provides the soil for moral hazard related to deposit insurance system. How to effectively reduce moral hazard has become a hot and difficult issue that all countries pay attention to when designing or improving their deposit insurance system. The Deposit Insurance Ordinance, which took effect in May 2015, marks the official establishment of China’s deposit insurance system. At this time, the author deeply studies and analyzes the causes, harms and the regulatory measures adopted in the deposit insurance system, and analyzes the moral hazard in China’s “Deposit Insurance Regulations” from a legal perspective, which will help to further improve the The implementation of the deposit insurance system in China accelerated the marketization of interest rates, the access of private banks and the introduction of the commercial bank insolvency law.