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已有研究发现,地方政府垄断国有土地转让一级市场是造成中国公共品供给重基础设施建设、轻公共服务的重要原因。当前“土地财政”包括低价协议出让工业用地“以地引资增税”和招、拍、挂国有土地获取土地出让金两种模式。本文利用2003-2008年284个城市面板数据实证研究发现,后者对中国公共品供给结构有更大的扭曲作用。进一步探讨微观机制的经验研究发现,经济性公共品的增量供给能显著提升国有土地招、拍、挂价格,而非经济性公共品则没有显著影响。因此,追逐高额的土地出让金就成为地方政府公共品供给行为扭曲的主要原因。
It has been found that the monopoly of state-owned land by local governments on the transfer of primary markets is an important reason for China’s provision of public goods with heavy infrastructure and light public services. At present, the “land finance” includes the transfer of industrial land under low-cost agreements to “increase tax by attracting land with land” and the two modes of obtaining land sales through the bidding and auctioning of state-owned land. In this paper, empirical study of 284 urban panel data from 2003 to 2008 finds that the latter has a more distorting effect on the supply structure of China’s public goods. Further study on the microscopic mechanism found that the incremental supply of economic public goods can significantly increase the price of state-owned land, but not the economic public goods. Therefore, the pursuit of high land transfer fees has become the main reason for the distortion of local government supply of public goods.