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我国环境政策由地方政府负责执行,地方政府的环境行为直接影响着整个国家的环境质量。本文运用博弈模型统筹分析中央政府、地方政府、环保部门与社会公众间的复杂博弈。中央政府加大对地方政府问责力度,加大环保指标在地方政绩考核体系中比重,降低地方政府履行环境责任成本可以推动地方政府共同选择实施环境保护行为;改变目前地方环保部门的双重领导体制,明晰责任主体和主体职责,可有效提高环境治理绩效;提高社会公众的环保意识,培育环保的社会团体力量,让社会民众成为环境监督和问责主体可以有效推动政府环境责任履行。
The environmental policy of our country is implemented by the local government, and the environmental behavior of the local government directly affects the environmental quality of the entire country. This paper uses the game model to make an overall analysis of the complex game between the central government, local governments, environmental protection departments and the public. The central government to increase the accountability of local governments, increase the proportion of environmental indicators in the local performance appraisal system, reduce the local government to fulfill the environmental responsibility costs can promote local governments to jointly choose to implement environmental protection behavior; change the current local environmental protection department’s dual leadership system , Clarifying the responsibilities and responsibilities of the main body can effectively improve the performance of environmental governance; improving the public awareness of environmental protection and cultivating the environmental protection of social groups so that the public can become the environmental supervision and accountability main body can effectively promote the fulfillment of government environmental responsibilities.