“供给侧”改革的核心之一是引导企业有序进入新行业,金融契约执行效率的高低会影响企业外部融资成本和进入决策,进而决定市场竞争程度。本文将不完全契约机制和古诺竞争引入动态一般均衡框架,从理论上阐释了金融契约执行效率对企业进入和市场竞争的影响机制。此外,本文使用1998—2007年中国制造业企业的微观数据对理论结果进行了实证检验,回归结果表明:金融契约执行效率越高的地区,企业进入激励越强、市场竞争越充分;从地区角度看,中部地区对金融契约执行效率的变动相对敏感;从行业角度看,技术密集型行业对金融契约执行效率的变动相对不敏感。 “Supply side ” One of the core reform is to guide enterprises to orderly enter the new industry, the level of implementation of the financial contract will affect the level of external financing costs and access to decision-making, and thus determine the degree of market competition. This paper introduces the incomplete contract mechanism and Cournot competition into the dynamic general equilibrium framework, and theoretically explains the impact mechanism of the execution efficiency of financial contracts on the entry of enterprises and market competition. In addition, this paper uses the micro-data of Chinese manufacturing enterprises from 1998 to 2007 to test the theoretical results. The regression results show that the higher the efficiency of financial contracts, the stronger the incentive to enter the market and the more competitive the market. From the regional perspective In view of the fact that the central region is relatively sensitive to changes in the efficiency of financial contracts, technology-intensive industries are relatively insensitive to changes in the efficiency of financial contracts from an industry perspective.